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The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 10 (2016) That moment seems to have occurred with Plotinus's theory of three "ones".'1 This paper will be focused on showing how deeply misleading this pronouncement is and on the consequences of tying so-called Neoplatonism to the interpretation of Plato's dialogue Parmenides.2 On the positive side, it is true that there were some self-declared followers of Plato who did in fact seek in Parmenides the secret to Plato's philosophy. This is clearly the case for Iamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, and Damascius. Nevertheless, first, it hardly needs emphasizing that there never was a Neoplatonic interpretation of this dialogue; Proclus was clearly aware of conflicting interpretations among self-declared Platonists. In this regard, however, it is true that all of these selfdeclared followers of Plato, at least from Plotinus onward, took the dialogue seriously as opposed to taking it as a mere logical exercise unrelated to any substantive issue. Second, Trouillard's remark assumes that taking the dialogue as a key to the secret of Plato's philosophy is an innovation (hence the 'Neo' of Neoplatonism). This assumption excludes out of hand the possibility that early members of the Old Academy such as Aristotle and Speusippus interpreted the dialogue in a 'Neoplatonic' way even if they did not take it as the key to the secret. Third, this assumption also tends to exclude the possibility that the so-called Neoplatonists were right to take Parmenides as containing serious doctrine for the simple reason that Plato himself did, too. Fourth, the 1 Trouillard 1973, 9 . See also Trouillard 1960, 191-193 where he assumes the primacy of Parmenides yet claims that dialogues like Phaedrus and Symposium are used to bring a spiritual dimension to the interpretation of Parmenides. The so-called Middle Platonic interpretation which Trouillard has in mind-found in Alcinous most clearly-is one according to which the first principle of all is conflated with the second principle, Intellect or the Demiurge, such that it becomes the principle of all. Krämer 1964a, 21-126 , showed that this interpretation has its origin in the Old Academy, in the philosophy of Xenocrates. Indeed, it is still present in Plotinus' classmate Origen. It also seems to be present in one form in Plotinus' disciple Amelius who, according to Proclus, In Tim. I 306.1-14, held that the three primary hypostases are three types of Intellect. Proclus proceeds to demolish this interpretation based on the principle that the first hypostasis must be absolutely simple. He then, I 309.14-310.2, cites Theodore of Asine as making the same error. See Proclus, PT II 4, for the rejection of Origen's position. I should add that this relatively neat picture is complicated by the fact that the Middle Platonic interpretation does not, so far as we know, purport to be an interpretation of Parmenides as opposed to a general interpretation of Plato's philosophy. Dillon 1993, 108-109 , thinks that the negative attributes of God in Alcinous' Didaskalilos X 4-ineffable, possessing no characteristics, and so on-are an 'unmistakeable' reference to the first hypothesis of the second part of Parmenides. By contrast, I will argue that the use of distinctions and arguments in this dialogue should be distinguished from a view according to which the dialogue has interpretative primacy. 2 For a concise history of interpretations of Parmenides in antiquity see Brisson 1994, 285-291. 
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The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 10 (2016) implicitly treated in the dialogues and explicitly indicated in Aristotle's testimony. In particular, the Idea of the Good in Republic, the Forms, the principles of Limit and Unlimited in Philebus, a divine Intellect or Demiurge in Timaeus, and Soul in numerous places, including especially Laws 10, are the metaphysical principles indirectly treated in Parmenides.6 Aristotle's testimony in regard to the Good, its identification with the One, and the mention of the Indefinite Dyad or Great-and-Small confirm the presence of these principles in Plato's philosophical thinking. This testimony is fraught with difficulties not the least reason for which is that Plato had apparently not completely worked out his own account of the principles, especially their dynamic relations.7 Consequently, all those ancient philosophers who saw in the second part of Parmenides the basic metaphysical principles in the background were correct to do so. But they were incorrect to claim to see there any indication of the dynamic relations among these, in particular the derivations or causal relations among them.8
On behalf of the above argument I will try to show that there is a fundamental difference in the way that Plotinus treats Parmenides and the way that virtually all of his Platonic successors do.9 The above incorrect reading of Parmenides is not Plotinus'; that reading probably originates with Iamblichus and is amplified by Proclus, Damascius, and many others.10 When I say this, 6 Note that Forms in general are not ultimate principles, but somehow 'reducible' to ultimate principles, according to Aristotle's testimony. Still, the dialogue speaks 'logically' about the properties of Forms as such. 7 I take the sentence in the 7th Epistle, 341B7-C2, where Plato disparages the accounts of those who purport to speak about the matters on which 'I am working ' (σπουδάζω) , to indicate that Plato had probably not even late in life worked out the details of the dynamics of his metaphysics. By contrast, I think the static architecture had probably been in place very early on in his career. 8
In this regard, F.M. Cornford 1939, 131-34 , was correct to question the Neoplatonic interpretation's identification of the One of the first hypothesis (137C4-142A8, henceforth H1) and the Idea of the Good of Republic. The identification of the two is not straightforward, but then why should we suppose that it must be so? Nevertheless, I will argue that it can be shown that the subject of H1 suitably analyzed must in fact be identical with the Idea of the Good. We should reach this conclusion even if we were to be convinced that Plato himself had not worked out completely how this is to be done. 9
This is the position briefly outlined in Gurtler 1992, 443-445 Beierwaltes 1985, 155-174 , uses the word 'dynamic' (dynamisch) differently, such that he can argue that Proclus has a dynamic metaphysics. By 'dynamic' Beierwaltes means 'relative' . That is, if two principles in the system are ὅμοιον, it follows that they are relatively identical (ταυτόν), but also different (ἕτερον). This logical distinction is, according to Beierwaltes the core of Proclus' dynamic metaphysics. See also Beierwaltes 1965, 34-35; Gersh 1973, 103 , 'dynamic logical relation' . As I will show, Proclus certainly wants to recognize causal dynamism in Plato's metaphysics. Nevertheless, his rejection of dynamism in the first principle of all skewers his overall account of the metaphysics. 12 It should be noted that Dodds's paper appeared more than 30 years prior to the seminal works of the so-called Tübingen School, and the subsequent shift in emphasis in the interpretation of Plato's philosophy from the dialogues to the unwritten teachings. This shift increased the prominence of the direct and indirect testimony of Aristotle and the later tradition. Dodds seems to assume that an interpretation of Plato's metaphysics must be an interpretation of one or more dialogues. One consequence of the Tübingen School's case is that no one dialogue-nor the sum of the dialogues-is likely to contain the 'secret' to Plato's metaphysics. Nevertheless, leading figures of this School tend to follow Dodds's line on the primacy of Parmenides for Plotinus. See, e.g., Krämer
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The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 10 (2016) 65-94 if one follows Dodds's argument-whether or not this interpretation goes back to the Old Academy-its persuasiveness will have a great deal to do with one's acceptance of the claim that the metaphysical principles are authentically Platonic. It is, unfortunately, all too common a view that the lack of persuasiveness of 'the Neoplatonic' interpretation of Parmenides invalidates the entire direct and indirect tradition of testimony regarding Plato's philosophy as well as the interpretation of the dialogues that supports and is supported by that testimony. Dodds provides a score or so of passages from Enneads that he supposes repeat or otherwise endorse things that are said in the first hypothesis (H1) and the second, H2 (142B1-155E3) of Parmenides.13 All these passages concern the properties of the One of H1 that is absolutely one or simple and the properties of the One-Being of H2 that is intrinsically complex. There is no question that Dodds is correct in supposing that Plotinus finds the One in H1 and his second principle, Intellect, in H2 (and the third, Soul, in H3 (155E4-157B5)). He tells us exactly this:
But Parmenides in Plato [as opposed to the historical Parmenides] speaks more accurately when he distinguishes from each other the primary One, which is strictly One, from the secondary One which is a one-many, and the third which is one and many. In this way he, too, is in harmony with the three natures.14 (1959), 487ff; Halfwassen (1992), 187-192 . See also Armstrong, 1940, 17, who (2) he clearly believes that Aristotle accurately represents the position even though Aristotle refers to no specific dialogues; rather, he takes it from Plato's unwritten doctrines as much as he does from any reading of these dialogues. In fact, in the vast majority of references to this dialogue, Plotinus makes use of the logical distinctions made therein.16 He does not refer specifically to Parmenides for insight into the properties of the principles beyond the perfunctory remarks that H1 concerns that which is 'one' , H2 that which is 'one-many' , and H3, that which is 'one and many' . When Plotinus, however, speaks of the operational properties of the One and Intellect and Soul and when he speaks of the generation of Intellect from the One and Soul from the One with the instrumentality of Intellect, far from relying on Parmenides, he draws his argument from elsewhere in the dialogues, from independent philosophical reasoning and, most importantly, from Aristotle himself. For the principal operational property of the One Plotinus draws on is that it is the Good and that it is primary ἐνέργεια.17 These two properties 'in harmony' with a doctrine of principles, but one has to go elsewhere for a positive expression of that doctrine. This is the passage Trouillard refers to as announcing the 'beginning' of Neoplatonism. Cf. Brisson, 287. 7, 17.10 and I 7, 1, 19-20 Plotinus says the One is ἐπέκεινα ἐνεργείας, which follows from its being ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας and ἐπέκεινα νοῦ. That is, just as the fact that it transcends οὐσία and νοῦς does not mean that it transcends being altogether, so the fact that it transcends ἐνέργεια (i.e., the ἐνέργεια of οὐσία and νοῦς) does not mean that it transcends activity altogether. It means that it transcends being or activity when these imply complexity. The One's ἐνέργεια is its being. Cf. III 8, 10.29-31 where neither being nor essence can be predicated (κατηγορεῖσθαι) of the One. 18 We can add the properties (= 'not inappropriate names') of βούλησις, VI 8, 13.21; ἔρως and ἐρώς ἑαυτοῦ, VI 8, 15.1-2; and 'transcendent thinking' (ὑπερνόησις), VI 8, 16.33 . Interestingly, Proclus, In Alc. 117, 96.10-11, agrees that ἔρως is ἐνέργεια, but ἔρως only descends from the intelligible realm, not from the One. See 52, 43.12-13. For Plotinus, the One is also 'selfcaused' (αἴτιον ἑαυτοῦ). See VI 8, 14.41. It is instructive that Plotinus is not deterred from using a reflexive pronoun for the One by the Parmenides arguments of H1, e.g., 138A2-B6, that the One cannot be in itself ('subjective genitive') or in another ('objective genitive').
his understanding of Plato's metaphysics primarily from dialogues other than Parmenides along with Aristotle's testimony and the testimony of the entire Platonic tradition than that he derives it from that dialogue alone or even primarily. He reads Parmenides to discover the logical properties of the principles; he does not start with Parmenides, taking it as a primary statement of the principles, and then try to fit the rest of the dialogues and the testimony to that reading.19 I conclude that this is the shape of his thinking because what Plotinus thinks is of overwhelming importance for Platonism is the dynamism of the system not the mere assertion of its basic architecture. This follows from his respectful acknowledgement and then disregard of those who were Platonists avant la lettre, so to speak. Dodds's second claim is that the Neoplatonic interpretation of Parmenides has its origin in the so-called Neopythagoreanism of Moderatus of Gades.
By contrast, cf. Proclus, PT II 4, 36.22-25, who thinks that 138A2-B6 removes the possibility of any self-reflexivity in the One. Plotinus follows the analysis of self-reflexivity in Aristotle's Unmoved Mover thinking of itself according to which this self-reflexivity does not compromise absolute simplicity. Proclus, trying to stay close to H1, thinks that the self-reflexivity of self-causation would imply complexity. Cf. VI 9, 4.51: the One is 'in itself' (ἐν αὑτῷ), by which Plotinus means that it is not related to anything by a real relation; VI 8, 16.15 (with VI 8, 13.57): 'the One causes itself to exist' (ὑποστήσας αὑτόν) and VI 8, 16.17: 'the One is self-actualization' (ἑαυτοῦ ἐνέργημα αὐτός) None of these claims for the One have any explicit or implicit warrant in H1. Proclus, In Tim. I 232.11-16, says that the One is 'superior to being self-constituted' (αὐθυπόστατος = αἴτιον ἑαυτοῦ, cf. In Parm. VII 1145.27; PT III 6, 20.17) because it must transcend all pluralization. Cf. In Parm. VII 1145 VII .26-1146 1149 .24-1150 . Proclus criticizes unnamed persons who want to make the first principle self-constituted. Presumably, this includes Plotinus. If so, Proclus himself must have appreciated the fundamental difference in his interpretation of Parmenides H1 from that of Plotinus. Therefore, I do not agree with Dillon (Morrow and Dillon 1987) , 477, who thinks that 'the whole dispute is really a matter of semantics' . Even though the One is not self-constituted, it is still, according to Proclus, the cause (αἴτιον) of those things that are, by 'conserving' (σῴζεσθαι) them in existence. See 1150.13-17; ΕΤ §57, 56.14-16; PT II 1, 3.6-8, πρωτίστην αἰτίαν. The concept of self-constitution is systematically exposed at ET § §40-51. As Dodds 1963, 223-224 , points out, the self-causality of the Henads is qualified; they are καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχηγικῶν αἰτίων καὶ παρ᾽ ἑαυτῶν. Cf. In Tim. III 39.4. 19 See the somewhat incautious remark of Krämer 1959, 473-74 and 1964b, 83, n.26 , to the effect that the Idea of the Good is 'philosophical half -nonsense' unless it is construed as the One (of H1). If we agree that 'Good' and 'One' refer to the identical principle, I think the dynamical aspect of the system will still be better understood if we focus on the former. quoting Plato. He is also correct in saying that these 'three Ones' belong to an interpretation of Plato, but there is no evidence that this is a direct interpretation of Parmenides. As we have already seen, Plotinus finds the three Ones in Parmenides, but these are principles otherwise discernible in the dialogues and in Aristotle's testimony. As much can be said for the 2nd Epistle wherein the mention of the three grades of reality-the king of all, things of the second order, and those of the third-is interpreted by Plotinus to represent metaphorically the three metaphysical principles.22 Both Zeller and Dodds seem to suppose that there must be one dialogue or letter which is the baseline for interpretation, but there is no evidence to support this. On the contrary, the nature of Aristotle's testimony makes it clear that the baseline is simply Plato's philosophy as this was partially revealed in the dialogues, but also transmitted orally. And the words 'partially revealed' must be understood not to indicate that there are discrete doctrines the exposition of which is confined to discrete dialogues but rather the unified metaphysical vision is revealed from various angles including by its application to the solution to specific philosophical problems. There is actually not one bit of evidence that prior to Iamblichus Parmenides was taken to have a unique place as a repository of Platonic metaphysics or theology. On the contrary, the privileged positioning of that dialogue seems to begin with Iamblichus and then to find its fullest expression in Proclus, who is himself following the lead of his mentor For they [the ancients] held that the One is higher than being and is the source of being; and they delivered it even from the status of a principle. For they held that, given the One in itself conceived as separated and alone without the other things, with no additional element, nothing else would come into existence. And so they introduced the Indefinite Dyad as the principle of beings.25
Just before this citation from Speusippus, Proclus gives the rationale for this claim.
If the first One participated in being in some way, although it is higher than being and produces it, it would be a one which appropriated the existence which belongs to being. But it is not some one, and is not the cause just of being but of everything, even though it is the cause of being before the rest. And if each thing necessarily participates in its cause, there must be a 'one' subordinate to the simply One and prior to being.26
It is probably the case that Proclus assumed that Speusippus is interpreting Parmenides in a way similar to his own interpretation. But in fact the quotation does not mention Parmenides. And the claim that the One is 'higher than being' and 'the source of being' can be directly derived from what is said about the Idea of the Good in Republic when combined with Aristotle's identification of the Good with the One.27 And yet once again, we need not deny that Speusippus saw in Parmenides the metaphysical architecture beneath the logical investigation.28 Especially interesting is the reason given for the introduction of the Indefinite Dyad. We may assume, I think, that the introduction of the Indefinite Dyad as a principle by Plato is confirmed by Aristotle's testimony. That the Indefinite Dyad is derived from the One-Good is also implied by that testimony.29 Is the Indefinite Dyad discoverable in Parmenides? At 143A2, near the beginning of H2, Parmenides argues that the One-Being must be 'unlimited in multitude' (ἄπειρον πλήθει) because One and Being, taken separately, leave us with a One which has being and Being which is one. So, these are indefinitely divisible. Is, then, One-Being the 'principle of beings'? It is not at all unreasonable that a Platonist should try to match up the Indefinite Dyad with a principle the logical properties of which are examined in H2. But the problem with this approach is that nowhere in Parmenides is the operation of the One on the putative Indefinite Dyad discussed. Nor, indeed, is the generation of the Indefinite Dyad addressed. According to Aristotle's testimony, it is ambiguous whether the operation of the One on the Indefinite Dyad is an operation on an independent principle or whether (as in Plotinus) the Indefinite Dyad is first itself derived from the One and then operated on by the One.30 If Plato is thought to have wanted to avoid an irreducible dualism, a great deal turns on how the Indefinite Dyad is supposed to be derived from the One. My claim is that the resources for arriving at a solution to this problem are not available in Parmenides. And much of the confusion and disagreement among later Platonists is owing precisely to their assumption that, on the contrary, the solution must somehow be there.
The principal hurdle facing those who are resolved to expose the dynamics of the Platonic system on the basis of an interpretation of Parmenides is that the One of H1 is described in a completely negative manner such that it can scarcely be thought to have a causal role to play in the generation of anything.31 Therefore, the One that serves this role has to be located in H2. But it cannot just be the One-Being which, at least according to Speusippus, and followed by 30 See Tim. 48C2-6 with 53D4-7 where Plato has Timaeus decline to speak about 'the principle or principles' (εἴτε ἀρχὴν εἴτε ἀρχὰς) of everything. Had this discussion occurred in Timaeus, dynamic or causal relations would have presumably been at the forefront. Plato also calls these principles στοιχεῖα ('elements') which is how Aristotle characterizes the One and the Indefinite Dyad. See Meta. Α 6, 987b19-20. 31 In the above quotation Proclus does indeed maintain that the One is the cause of everything. See In Parm. VI, 1108.19-20 . Exactly how this is so is, for Proclus, a vexed matter. In PT I 12, 58.11-22, Proclus argues that the last four negative hypotheses of Parmenides ('if the One is not' , 'if there is no One'), since they are reductio arguments, show that everything depends on the One for its existence. In PT II 4, Proclus excoriates the interpretation of Origen, the classmate of Plotinus, who argued that since the putative subject of H1 cannot exist, the real One must be the One of H2, that is, it must be identified with Intellect. Proclus calls this a 'Peripatetic innovation' . Evidently, the desire to avoid such an innovation is part of the motive for assigning to the One of H1 a distinct role to play. It is just that, within the confines of Parmenides, this role cannot be described in other than negative terms. Proclus, is indefinitely divisible and is identified with the Indefinite Dyad. So, we have to posit within H2 a One which is the principle of One-Being or otherwise make the One-Being to be derived from a One that is capable of actually causing it. Needless to say, none of this is in H2. On the one hand, Parmenides in its logical austerity does not have the resources to explain how the first principle of all has any sort of causal efficacy.32 On the other hand, the One taken as the Idea of the Good, which is explicitly said to exercise causality on the being and essence of Forms, makes a good deal more sense. At the same time, we need not suppose that to characterized the One of H1 as absolutely simple because absolutely one or incomposite is wrong. We can, I think, suppose that Plato left it to the reader to figure out how this One operates.33 We need not suppose that Plato himself had no solution to this problem. Proclus unambiguously identifies the One of H1 with the Idea of the Good in Republic.34 He also tries to reconcile the causal role of the Idea of the Good with absence of causality, or even the conditions for the possibility 32 I want to emphasize here that Proclus certainly dwells at length in many places on the dynamic relations within the intelligible realm. See Gersh 1973, passim and esp. ch.4. See ET §33, 36.11-19 on the centrality of (κυκλικὴ) ἐνέργεια in the triadic structuring of the intelligible realm. Nevertheless, Proclus does not get his metaphysical dynamics from Parmenides. It is also important to emphasize that Proclus, unlike Plotinus, does not, owing to his focus on Parmenides, consider any dynamical aspect to the first principle. This makes his dynamics of the intelligible realm problematic, to say the least. 33 The explicitly aporetic conclusion of Parmenides (at least with respect to the problems raised in the first part of the dialogue) mirrors the explicitly aporetic conclusion of Theaetetus. The latter dialogue, like the former, is a 'logical' investigation of the properties of ἐπιστήμη which must be (the logical 'must') both infallible and have as its 'objects' what is real. Hence ἐπιστήμη cannot be αἴσθησις nor can it be ἀληθὴς δόξα, nor even ἀληθὴς δόξα with a λόγος added. We need to go to other dialogues such as Republic and Timaeus for a positive account of ἐπιστήμη. Horn 1995, 96, seems to think that to insist on the explicitly aporetic conclusion of Parmenides is to admit that it is implicitly aporetic, too, a sign of Plato's 'honest perplexity' as Gregory Vlastos might have put it. But this does not follow for either of these dialogues. §175, 152.30-32 for the principle providing the warrant for the architectural extravagance: οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ αἱ πρόοδοι γίνονται ἀμέσως, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ ὁμοίων κατά τε τὰς ὑποστάσεις καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τελειότητας ὡσαύτως (For nowhere do processions occur unmediated, but rather through existents and perfections of actuality of things that are connatural and the same). See Beierwaltes 1965, 31-48 , on this principle. 37 At ET §33, 36.11-12 we have the principle: Πᾶν τὸ προϊὸν ἀπό τινος καὶ ἐπιστρέφον κυκλικὴν ἔχει τὴν ἐνέργειαν. (Everything that proceeds from something and reverts to it has a cyclical activity). Proclus explains that the 'motion' (κίνησις) originates 'from that which remains' (ἀπὸ τοῦ μένοντος). This cyclical process does not appear to apply to the ineffable One since the reversion is always a participation and the One is unparticipated. This is the case even though the One-Good is the primary object of desire and the primary object of desire is that towards which all things revert. See §31, 34.35-32.2. 38 Parm. 134E8-135C3. The dialogue is also quite obviously relevant to the substantive metaphysics of Sophist. Horn 1995, 96-99 , thinks that the relevance of Part 2 to the problems of Part 1 is found in Aristotle, Meta. Α 6, 988a7-17, wherein the One and the Great-and-Small are said to be the causes of Forms. This is true indirectly, I suppose, but only in the sense that the logical distinctions made there must be shown to be applied to Forms.
metaphysical expositions introduced only to solve a particular problem, in the first case how the sophist's métier can be non-being, in the second, what is the appropriate mixture of pleasure and intellectual activity in the best life for man, and in the third how to account for the beauty and order of the cosmos. The ad hoc introduction of metaphysics, of course, does not diminish its importance and it certainly does not justify its exclusion from an overall account of Plato's philosophy. But it does mean, I would suggest, that the view of Parmenides as a self-standing or at least load-bearing beam in the architecture of Plato's metaphysics is unsustainable. The best evidence I can muster for this claim is to display the convoluted constructs produced by later Platonists determined to divine in Parmenides much more than the basic elements of the metaphysical structure. There is obviously not adequate space to do that here. Nor shall I attempt to explain exactly how I see the second part of the dialogue contributing to the solution to what is in effect a super dilemma posed by Parmenides: either Forms are completely separate from the sensible world, in which case they are irrelevant to thought and discourse about it or else they are implicated in the samenesses and differences ( and hence intelligibility) among things here below, in which case they are susceptible to puzzles about their division and vicious infinite regress arguments. I shall only say here that the distinctions among senses of 'one' , 'many' , 'part' , 'whole' , 'limit' , 'unlimited' , 'same' , 'identical' , and so on made in the second part of the dialogue will be essential to a correct representation of Forms and their participants. Moreover, these distinctions must be applied within the framework of principles that are the basic elements of Plato's metaphysics. But that is as much as need be conceded to Parmenides partisans. These partisans never did eschew appeal to other dialogues or to the direct and indirect tradition of testimony. For example, almost everyone seems to be in agreement that the One of Parmenides H1 is just the Idea of the Good.39 But there are so many claims made about the Idea of the Good in Republic that seem incompatible with the description of the One of H1 that much time is spent in explaining away the plain sense of the text. For example, everyone can agree that the Idea of the Good is 'above οὐσία' and as such is not necessarily in conflict with the One of H1 which also does not partake in οὐσία.40 39 See, e.g., Damascius, De princ. I 65.7-8, who takes the μέγιστον μάθημα of Rep. 504E4-5 which is referring to the Idea of the Good as equally referring to the One. Damascius, however, thinks that the first principle of all is utterly ineffable and uncognizable, in which case the Idea of the Good gets identified with a second One, the One of H1. On ineffability in general in later Platonism see Hoffman 1997. 40 See Rep. 509B9-10; Parm. 141D9.
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The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 10 (2016) But it is much harder to show how the Good, which is the source of being and essence for Forms, and which is the cause of their knowability and truth can refer to the same principle that in H1 can have no causal relation to anything.41 There can be an account (λόγος) of the Idea of the Good; there can be no such thing for the One of H1.42 In addition, the Idea of the Good is the 'happiest of that which is' (εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος) and the 'best among things that are' (τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὖσι).43 Needless to say, it is something of a puzzle as to how these attributes can be applied to the One of H1.44
The appropriate rejoinder to these disanalogies between the Idea of the Good in Republic and the One of H1 of Parmenides should be, I think, to insist that the absolute simplicity of the first principle of all cannot be sustained if the characterizations of the Good in Republic are taken to introduce complexity of any sort, including the complexity assumed in true predication.45 For example, it is not a defect in the Neoplatonic interpretation of Parmenides and the assimilation of the Idea of the Good to the One of H1 to maintain that the Good cannot be the source of knowability or truth in Forms by surreptitiously introducing into it οὐσία distinct from its existence. Indeed, even making it one would be to do exactly that, for then it and its oneness would be distinct, where 'one' names the sort of οὐσία it has. So, since none of these characterizations can be supposed to introduce complexity, the possibilities for driving 41 See Rep. 509B9-10, on cause of being and essence; 508E1-4 with 508A9-B7, 509B6, on cause of knowability and truth. See Parm. 139E4-5 on the One's not having a self-identity and 141D10-11 on the One not being one. 42 See Rep. 508E4, 517B8-C1, 532B1, 534B3-D1; Parm. PT II 7, claim that the Good is φανότατον τοῦ ὄντος (Rep. 518C9) as meaning only that the Good is the 'cause' (αἴτιον) of the light emanating from it. 44 Horn 1995, 106 , thinks that the One of H1 is a 'suitable candidate' for the unhypothetical first principle of Republic because of its ultimacy. Logically speaking, yes; substantively, no. The One of H1 is an absolutely simple first principle of all, but its simplicity is unanalyzed. Cf. Halfwassen 2004, 214-215. 45 Cf. Soph. 245A8-9 where the Parmenidean One is criticized because it is understood as holding that the One is One-Being and therefore not simple. Halfwassen 2011, 69-70 , is correct to conclude that the 'absolute simplicity' of the One excludes from it every 'determination and structure ' . Cf. 2004, 268 . He does not, however, consider that what René Arnou long ago called 'l'activité par excellence' does not preclude absolute simplicity. See Arnou 1921, 70 . The evidence Halfwassen, 1999, 415-420, cites to show that in and around the early Academy the One was subject only to 'negative dialectic' , e.g., passages from Theophrastus' Metaphysics, do not entail that the One was understood as Proclus understood it.
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The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 10 (2016) 65-94 a wedge, so to speak, between Good and One are severely reduced or, more likely, eliminated. As I say, this is a legitimate rejoinder, but it fails take account of a more sophisticated concept of simplicity. Plotinus's analysis of simplicity is a stellar example of his purely philosophical approach to central issues that are not subjected to analysis in the dialogues.46 That concept of simplicity is also analyzed by Aristotle who identified unqualified simplicity with perfect actuality (ἐνέργεια), and perfect actuality with intellectual activity (ἐνέργεια νοῦ).47 Somewhat less paradoxically, Aristotle argues that form is actuality in relation to matter or potency. Form without matter or any potency would be perfect actuality. The unique example of perfect actuality is the activity of thinking uncontaminated with potency. This is the activity of the Unmoved Mover, whose uniqueness follows from its perfection: if there were more than one examples of such activity, each would have to have potency to distinguish it from the other. So, perfect actuality is perfect simplicity, that is, incompositeness. Plotinus embraces the concept of perfect ἐνέργεια without potency as applicable to the first principle of all. He denies, though, Aristotle's identification of this activity with thinking, for thinking cannot be unqualifiedly simple. Thinking is complex at least because a thinker and an intentional object of thinking must be distinguished. In addition, if the thinking is of a multiplicity of intelligibles, then further complexity or multiplicity is introduced. Plotinus accepts the analysis of the simplicity of a first principle offered by Aristotle, but he rejects the primacy of the Unmoved Mover.48 By contrast, Proclus and other proponents of the 'Neoplatonic' interpretation of Parmenides think that not only is the ἐνέργεια νοῦ necessarily complex, but any ἐνέργεια must be so. So, the first principle of all in its absolute simplicity cannot be ἐνέργεια.49 It cannot even be one or be in any way.
An obvious problem faces us. Since ἐνέργεια is not a term that even appears in Plato's writings, why should we suppose that Plotinus's understanding of the first principle of all in Plato-whether we call this the Idea of the Good 46 See on simplicity II 9, 1.8; V 3, 11.27-31; V 3, 13.33-36; V 4, 1.10-13, etc. 47 See Meta. Λ 7. See Halfwassen 1999, 389, who cites Hegel's extreme but perceptive judgment that Plotinus got more from Aristotle than from Plato. 48 See V 6, 1.1-14. Cf. III 8, 9.8-13; V 1, 9; V 3, 11.25-30; VI 9, 2.17-19. It should also be noted that Plotinus also follows Aristotle in the use of (ἐξ)ἀρτᾶσθαι for the dependence of all things on the primary ἐνέργεια. See e.g., I 6, 7.10; II 2, 2.4; III 2, 3.33; V 3, 12.20; V 5, 3.6; VI 8, 18.7, et cet. 49 See PT II 7, 49.14 , where the One is said to have a 'unique pre-eminence in simplicity' (μίαν ἁπλότητος ὑπερβολὴν). No doubt this is so, but it completely ignores Aristotle's argument about the nature of simplicity.
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The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 10 (2016) I 8, 15.3-5 where the argument is that if matter did not exist (εἶναι), then the Good would also not exist (εἶναι). Also, V 5, 6.21, where the existence of the One is emphatically distinguished from its putative knowability. Cf. V 5, 11.7-8: εἶναι . . . μάλιστα πάντων in reference to the One. See Kremer 1966, 172-185; Baltes 1997 . Abbate 2003 exposes how Proclus, in Essay XI of his Commentary on Plato's Republic, argues that the One is ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας because it is ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος. He thinks the latter is the case because at Rep.508E1-4 (cf. 508A9-B7 and 509B6), Plato says that the Good provides truth to Forms or to being. If this is so, then truth is distinct from and superior to being. And the Good is superior to truth. 53 See e.g., V 3, 11.27. 54 Incidentally, although Plotinus and Proclus agree that the One is not related to anything (although things are related to it), their reasons for holding this are importantly different. Plotinus says that the One is not really related to anything because real relations are between or among οὐσίαι. See I 7, VI 8, . Proclus says that the One is not related to anything owing to its absolute transcendence. See In Tim. I 304.9, 11; PT II 5, III 8, . 'Transcendence' here indicates the absence of any causal connection, as stated explicitly in the last text.
Furthermore, it is uniquely called 'Good' because it is the goal of all desire. This is an important point because all Platonists recognize that the reason for the Good being the goal of all desire is that it is the source of all that desires.55 Hence, the fundamental triad μονή-πρόοδος-ἐπιστροφή.56 The 'procession' from the Good or, if we like, the One, looks very much like the 'external' activity of the first principle, as distinct from the 'internal' activity which is its perdurance or μονή.57 The Good, Plotinus thought, could not but be ἐνέργεια if it is to be the unifying principle of all.58 Plotinus has little difficulty in fitting the negative characterization of the One in H1 into this account of the Good.59 Neoplatonists have considerable difficulty when they start with the One negatively described and focus on the negativity to try to flesh out its role as principle rather than appealing to ἐνέργεια as a systematic term for the activity of 55 See Proclus, ET § §31-34 . 56 See esp. Beierwaltes 1965, 118-164 . This fundamental doctrine in later Platonism is already outlined in Plotinus, V 2, 1.7-21. 57 See V 4, II 9, IV 5, V 1, 6.34; V 3, V 9, VI 2, VI 7, VI 7, VI 7, . The distinction between ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας (internal activity) and ἐνέργεια ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας (external) is explicitly applied to the One itself, despite the fact that it is ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας (see esp. V 1, 6.45-46). As I construe this, the distinction is applicable to the One because its being or existence is not distinct from its οὐσία. That is, being ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας means that it does not μετέχει οὐσίας. Halfwassen 1992, 98-130 and 1997, 17-18 denies that what I am calling the 'dynamism' of the Platonic system is thematized by Plotinus. As he puts it, only the 'fact' of the generation of a many from a one, not the 'how' and 'why' , are knowable by us. 58 Cf. Aristotle, Meta. Λ 10, 1075a11-25 and Plotinus' allusion to this passage at III 3, 2.5-6.
Aristotle compares primary ἐνέργεια to an army general and to the head of a household. At De mun. 6, 400b6-11, to these metaphors are added those of ship's captain, a charioteer, the leader of a chorus, and the law (or lawgiver) of the city (depending on the correct text). The principal point is that Plotinus accepts from Aristotle the claim that primary ἐνέργεια is productive. But, against Aristotle, he argues that this is true only of the primary ἐνέργεια that is the Good. Aristotle recognizes that there must be a primary object of desire, but he mistakenly identifies this with the primary object of intellection, instead of with that which is beyond Intellect. See Meta. Λ 7, 1072a27-8. 59 See III 8, 10.28-31 where Plotinus says that neither τὸ ὄν nor οὐσία nor ζωή can be predicated (κατηγορεῖσθαι) of that which is simply One (τὸ ἀπλῶς ἕν). The chapter begins with Plotinus insisting that if the δύναμις that is the One did not exist' (μὴ οὔσης), then nothing would exist. I take it that lines 28-31 cannot be interpreted in such a way that this inference is contradicted. Being is not a predicate of the One; it is its οὐσία. Cf. III 8, 11.12-13; III 9, 9.22-23; V 5, 13.9-11, etc.
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The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 10 (2016) 65-94 the Idea of the Good and then using H1 to enrich the characterization of the first principle.60 The One of H2, One-Being or, as Plotinus puts it, 'one-many' , poses a slightly different problem for interpreters. Plotinus and his successors agree that this One includes not only what is unqualifiedly intelligible, but it also includes that which is intelligible wherever it may be, including in the sensible world. That is why at the end of H2 it is said that there can be δόξα and αἴσθησις of it, not only ἐπιστήμη.61 There can be various types of cognition of everything that is even minimally intelligible; matter alone is not cognizable precisely because it is not intelligible. However, for all Platonists the intelligible realm is also the realm of intellect and intellection. But nowhere does H2 mention this. Plotinus spends much effort in explaining how Intellect is a 'one-many' .62 Indeed, it is an (imperfect) One as derived from the first principle, meaning that it has the potency for manyness realized in its return to that principle. This δύναμις is fundamentally different from that of the One which is δύναμις τῶν πάντων. The One has no potency for being other than what it is; Intellect is generated with the potency for becoming a specific many, the many that is a composite of intellection and intelligibles. It is as such that it achieves its desire for the first principle of all.
It really makes little sense to insinuate Intellect directly into H2. Neoplatonists admit as much when, like Plotinus, they appeal to the Demiurge in Timaeus and a divine Intellect in Laws 10 as implicitly present in H2. But the derivation of Intellect and the precise sense in which it is a one-many depends on the first principle being the Good. Plotinus appeals to Parmenides for confirmation of the Platonic architecture; he looks elsewhere for insight into the dynamism of the system.63 Adhering to the text, he thinks that H2 covers much more ground than the nature of Intellect, even though Intellect is discoverable there as a 'one-many' . Neoplatonists who are committed to finding Intellect solely 60 Proclus uses an abundance of terms, drawn partly from Republic and partly from religious texts, to characterize the One positively or as causally active. For example, it is γεννητικός ('generative') and γόνιμος ('fruitful'), PT II 7, 49.27-50.11 ; ὑποστατικός ('productive'), PT II 12, . But these characterizations are in sharp contrast to the way he interprets the One of H1 of Parmenides. And given that interpretation, these attributes are bound to be largely honorific. 61 See Parm. 155D6. 62 IV 8, 3.10; V 1, 8.26; V 3, 15.11; VI 2, 2.2; VI 2, 10.11; VI 2, 15.14; VI 2, 21.7; VI 2, 22.10; VI 5, VI 6, 8.22; VI 6, VI 7, VI 7, VI 7, In Parm. II 768.21 , says that Intellect is a one-many, but there is nothing in H2 to support this directly. 63 Indeed, as Gurtler 1992, 445-457 , shows, Plotinus is even critical of at least one way of understanding the deductions in H2.
within the confines of H2 have no basis for the analysis of its generation or its activity in relation to the One. Indeed, as with Proclus, they have no reason not to insert the gods or henads between Intellect and the One.64 Aristotle's account of the Good as One and its operation on the Indefinite Dyad is, as noted above, a problem for a monistic conception of Platonism.65 Since the division between H1 and H2 is unambiguous, Platonists who want to rely primarily on Parmenides have no choice but to locate the Indefinite Dyad in H2, for if it were in H1 it could only be the ineffable One which alone is the subject of that hypothesis. As we have seen, it is not unreasonable to identify the 'unlimited in multitude' with the Indefinite Dyad. But the problem here is squaring this with Aristotle's testimony where the One that works on the Indefinite Dyad is the first principle of all. Proclus derives Limit, containing generative potency, from the transcendent One, which is identified with the Idea of the Good. He thus rejects Aristotle's testimony insofar as this can be taken to identify implicitly Good, One, and Limit. The strength of Proclus's interpretation is that it uses the Philebus account of Limit and Unlimited to block Aristotle's claim that the One is Limit. So, in effect Proclus wants to insist upon two Ones, the first of which is identical with the Good, the first principle of all, and the second of which is identical with the One which is Limit.66
64 See e.g., Proclus, PT I 14, 67.10-11; I 15, 76.25-77.1. At ET §121, 106.5-7, Proclus says ἐν θεοῖς οὖν ἡ πρόνοια πρώτως. καὶ ποῦ γὰρ ἡ πρὸ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ἢ ἐν τοῖς ὑπερουσίοις; ἡ δὲ πρόνοια, ὡς τοὔνομα ἐμφαίνει, ἐνέργειά ἐστι πρὸ νοῦ (Providence rests primarily with the gods; indeed, where should the activity prior to intellect other than in those that are prior to being? For providence, as the name reveals, is an activity prior to intellect). The identification of ἐνέργεια with the Henads actually highlights Proclus' refusal to identify ἐνέργεια with the One. 65 See Halfwassen 1997 who is right to resist the dualism but wrong to insist that the Neoplatonic interpretation of Parmenides can be the starting-point for arriving at a consistent monism. He insists on the 'asymmetry' of the One and the Indefinite Dyad, 10-11, since while the One can exist without any pluralization, the Indefinite Dyad-having a sort of unity in itself-cannot exist without the One. 66 See PT III 8, 31.14-18: Ἔστιν ἄρα τι πρὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἕν, ὃ καὶ ὑφίστησι τὸ ὂν καὶ αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ ὄντος πρώτως, ἐπειδὴ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἑνώσεως ἐπέκεινα καὶ τῆς αἰτίας ἦν, ἄσχετον πρὸς πάντα καὶ ἀμέθεκτον ἀπὸ πάντων ἐξῃρημένον (There is, therefore, some One prior to being which causes being to exist and is the primary cause of being, since prior to it [the One that is the cause of being] there is that which is removed beyond unity and causality, unrelated to everything and unparticipated by everything). Cf. Syrianus, . This claim contradicts Plotinus, VI 9, 2.24, who says, pace Meijer 1992, 105-106, that Intellect has the One by μετάληψις and by μέθεξις. Cf. VI 8, 13.14. That for Plotinus the OneGood is participated and that for Iamblichus and Proclus it is not constitutes the clearest divergence in their respective interpretations of the first principle of all and, indirectly,
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He argues for the ambiguity of 'One' such that Aristotle is right to identify the Good with the One and right to identify the One with Limit but wrong to elide these identifications such that it is the Good as One that is also the One that is Limit. The weakness of his interpretation is that there is no evidence that Parmenides derives the One of H2 from the One of H1 thereby providing a basis for the supposed ambiguity. The point here is not that in a reconstruction of Platonic metaphysics, 'One' is not to be used ambiguously; indeed, this must be the case, since the first principle of all is uniquely One.67 Rather, the putative ambiguity is in 'One' used as another name for the Idea of the Good and 'One' used as another name for Limit, coordinated with the principle of Unlimitedness. The insistence on the ambiguity and hence on the inexactness of Aristotle's testimony is, I suggest, owing to the assumption that the One of H1, given the description of it, could never be identified with the One that is Limit. How can the One-Good be a principle of Limit if it cannot even be properly said to be one? Proclus is correct to worry about this, but his reliance on the architecture visible in Parmenides leads to postulate unnecessary additions in order to fill in for the absent dynamics.68 Plotinus is in agreement with those who will later insist that the first principle of all is unqualifiedly unlimited.69 Any limitation on it could only be a function of an οὐσία that it does not have. The One-Good, however, is a limit on its immediate product, Intellect, not in its initial phase, but in its return or ἐπιστροφή to the One. Hence, it is a limit on of the import of Parmenides. Proclus, PT II 7, 50.10-11, says that because the Good (i.e., the One) is unparticipated (τῷ ἀμέθεκτον εἶναι) its causal power is uniform for everything. For Plotinus, the causal power of the One is infinitely diverse or complex. It seems to me that in the Anonymous Commentary on Plato's Parmenides, fr. V 22-29, the attribution of 'pure acting' (ἐνεργεῖν καθαρόν) to the One and the claim that the second One participates in it suggests that this work, if it is indeed by Porphyry, sets him alongside Plotinus and over against Iamblichus and Proclus. Proclus seems to agree with this assessment. See PT II 4, 31.26. I disagree with Hadot 1973, 31 , however, who thinks that this fragment reveals for the first time in the history of Western thought the idea of infinite being, that is, being that is participated but not thereby limited or made complex. This fragment follows Plotinus for whom the absolute simplicity of the One guarantees its infinity. 67 Cf. Plotinus, V 1, , where the ambiguity is expressed as 'One' which is primarily One, and the secondary One, which is properly One-Many, namely, Intellect. 68 The proliferation of architectural elements is already on display in Iamblichus. I explain this by his embrace of the primacy of Parmenides. See Dodds 1963, xxii, on the proliferation of entities in Proclus and his explicit reliance on Iamblichus in this regard. See Beierwaltes 1985, 155-157 , on proliferations of entities, particularly τᾶ μεταξύ, as differentiating the metaphysics of Proclus from that of Plotinus. 69 See e.g., V 5, 9.1-18; V 8, 9.24-25; V 5, 11.1-2.
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The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 10 (2016) 65-94 additions, spandrels serving no functional purpose. For modern students of Platonism, the assumption that this focus practically defines late Platonism unfairly condemns Plotinus for an error he did not make. The rejection of the 'Neoplatonic' interpretation of Parmenides, insofar as it aligns Aristotle's testimony with that interpretation, leads to the unjustifiable discounting of that testimony. The discounting is unjustifiable because Aristotle's account of Plato's philosophy comes not from an interpretation of that dialogue, but from passages in numerous other dialogues and, in all probability, from Plato's own spoken words.74 Without that testimony-and its extensive support from the indirect tradition-we are left with a deracinated Plato and the temptation simply to ignore the plain sense of dozens of passages in the dialogues.
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